DoubleThink

Do we mock ourselves out of pride or shame? I can never tell which. Sometimes I say “Wow, I suck so hard!” This is because I just failed in an endeavor, and wish to communicate my failing to the public. It also bolsters my confidence, gives a small promise that next time I will not suck so hard. Other times I scream “Why am I hopeless?” That stems from my shame; I am a useless lunatic chasing butterflies across continents. But it gives me an excuse; it says “You are nobler than everyone else; that is why you seem hopeless; it is merely the result of high morals.” They two motivations contradict each other, but I firmly believe that both of them come into play.

Can a person think like that? Can someone supply two contradicting motives, and follow them both? I suppose if an action fulfills two different motives at once, those two motives cannot be contradicting. But is an action simultaneously strokes and punishes the ego not contradictory? How can an action compel me to feel both better and worse about myself at the same time?

Others assert that there truly is only one motive; one of those supposed motivations is a front, a façade put up to defend yourself. You appear to be screaming out of shame; but truly, you only stoke your own ego. Then why add the farce? Is that farce not a sign of shame feeding your ego? One contradiction disappears, but another has sprung up. Why do you conceal your own motives, if not out of a sense of shame? This argument may turn into a “who came first” scenario. Your sense of shame results from a need to stroke your ego. But your ego requests that you feel the shame to stroke your ego, but since you are concealing that, you only confirm the shame. That does not prove that shame and ego are exclusive; if anything, it confirms the observation that they co-exist in one action. The trouble is, when a person commits such a paradoxical act, he also knows his motivations. He knows, if secretly, that he I only pleasing himself, and he knows, secretly, the recursive logic that meshes the two incompatible motives into one. Which shall he eliminate?

Ah, here comes my kicker: Doublethink. This famous concept, pioneered by George Orwell in the novel 1984, explains the mental conditioning of its dystopian citizens as conscious double-think; to be able to hold and believe in two contradictory statements through mental training and brainwashing. The concept unsettles the reader satisfyingly, and then he continues with his work. Doublethink happens whenever we face such a moral dilemma. Subconsciously, we enter the recursive logic of both motives being extensions of the other, until both motives become valid. We scream and complain for both these motives, regardless of contradiction.

At this point I no longer know how to finish the post. The canned endings fail me. I have tried to explain something natural, and now I have finished. I guess I’ll hum a merry tune and walk along the rose bushes now, creating this picturesque image because I feel the whimsicality of the act, and because I wanted to create something original to convince myself that I can in fact write.

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The strikes were carried out only by fighter-bombers, in low altitude precision bombing modes, and populated areas we scrupulously avoided. Final target determinations were made in Washington, with due attention to the nature of the target, its geographical location, the weight of attack, the risk of collateral damage, and the like.

p.19 They accepted bombing proposals only in weekly target packages.

Despite such gains, the overall effect of initiating Rolling Thunder was somewhat disappointing. The hopes in some quarters that merely posing a credible threat of substantial damage to come might be sufficient “pressure” to bring Hanoi around had been frustrated.

p.20 This public rationale for the bombing had increasingly become the most acceptable internal rationale as well, as decision-makers sought to prevent runaway escalation and to hold down the bombing in what they thought should be a secondary role in the war. As a venture in “strategic persuasion” the bombing had not worked. The most obvious reason was that it was too light, gave too subdued and uncertain a signal, and exerted too little pain.

p.53

After the bombing of the North was begun, other U.S. actions – unleashing U.S. jet aircraft for air strikes in the South, and sending U.S. ground troops into battle there – had as great or even greater claim as manifestations of U.S. will and determination.

p.55-6

CIA and DIA, in a joint monthly Appraisal of the bombing of North Vietnam…

The direct losses, in the language of one of the monthly appraisals, “…still remain small compared to total economic activity, because the country is predominantly agricultural and the major industrial facilities have not been attacked.”

p. 113 (A memo sent to Defense secretary mcnamara)

Physical consequences of the bombing

a.       The DRV has suffered some physical hardship and pain, rasing the cost to it of supporting the VC.

b.      Best intelligence judgment is that:

a.       Bombing may or may not – by destruction or delay – have resulted in the net reduction in the flow of men or supplies to the forces in the Sotuh;

b.      Bombing has failed to reduce the limit on the capacity of the DRV to aid the VC to a point below VC needs;

c.       Future bombing of North Vietnam cannot be expected physically to limit the military support given the VC by the DRV to a point below VC needs.

Influence consequences of bombing

a.       There is no evidence that bombings have made it more liekyl the DRV will decide to back out of the war.

b.      Nor is there evidence that bombings have resulted in an increased DRV resolve to continue the war to an eventual victory.

[Paraphrase] The military report then suggests a ground interdiction, supported by aircraft instead. [/paraphrase]

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